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India and Pakistan have been embroiled in an intractable dispute over the
Kashmir region since the end of British colonial rule.' In 1998, the conflict
became far more troubling to the international community,2 as both India and
Pakistan developed and tested nuclear weapons.' The United States and other
countries have taken measures, including economic sanctions to encourage
India and Pakistan to halt the advancement of their nuclear programs.4
However, since India and Pakistan have colorable claims under international
law for developing and maintaining their nuclear weapons, the focus should be
on resolving the Kashmir dispute so as to avert a nuclear conflict. This Note
will argue that the United Nations Security Council (U.N.S.C.) should pass a
new resolution aimed at resolving the dispute; to be successful, this resolution
must be backed diplomatically and, if necessary, militarily, by the United
States.
In October 2002, the United States Congress authorized President George
W. Bush to use force against Iraq to enforce U.N.S.C. resolutions pertaining
to the development of weapons of mass destruction.5 In November 2002, the
U.N.S.C. passed Resolution 1441, which required Iraq to cooperate fully with
UN weapons inspectors, to give a full and accurate account of its weapons of
mass destruction programs, and to disarm it to the extent that weapons and
* J.D. 2004, University of Georgia School of Law; B.A. 2000, University of Georgia.
See Ali Khan, The Kashmir Dispute: A Plan For Regional Cooperation, 31 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 495, 495 (1994).
2 See Grant Guthrie, Nuclear Testing Rocks the Sub-continent: Can International Law Halt
the Impending Nuclear Conflict Between India and Pakistan?, 23 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 495,495 (2000); see also Angelique R. Kuchta, A Closer Look: The U.S. Senate's Failure
to Ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 19 DICK. J. INT'LL. 333, 335 (2001).
' See Sarah P. Schuette, U.S. Economic Sanctions Regarding the Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons: A Callfor Reform of the Arms Export Control Act Sanctions, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
231,232 (2001).
4 Id. at 240.
' H.R.J. Res. 114, 107th Cong. (2002) (enacted).
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weapons programs exist.6  After several months of renewed weapons
inspections in Iraq and a failed attempt by the United States to gain support for
a second U.N.S.C. resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq, the
United States invaded Iraq in March 2003 under the auspices of Resolution
1441.' An authorization of the kind sought by the United States would
necessarily be premised on a threat to "international peace and security" within
the meaning of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.8 However, this Note contends
that the situation in Kashmir was and is at least as great a threat to interna-
tional peace and security as that posed by Iraq, if not greater. Thus, the United
States should deal with the conflict in Kashmir as urgently as it addressed the
threat of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.
This Note examines the situation in Kashmir, including the extent of its
threat to international peace and security and a possible means of resolution of
the conflict. Part II gives the historical background of the Kashmir conflict.
Part III looks at the international security implications of the current situation
in Kashmir. Part IV argues that customary international law and treaties are
ineffective in detering a potential nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan
over Kashmir, and that, therefore, the focus, both legally and practically,
should be on resolving the territorial dispute. Part V examines existing
U.N.S.C. resolutions regarding Kashmir. Part VI compares the threat to
international peace and security and the legal justification for U.N.S.C. action
in the Kashmir situation to that of other situations, specifically Iraq, in which
the UN has been asked to act. Part VII suggests that a new international
custom has developed since the end of the Cold War, with the United States
serving as the enforcement mechanism of similar U.N.S.C. resolutions, and
that this near custom is necessary to ensure that the resolutions are ultimately
effective. This Note will conclude that the Kashmir conflict is a serious threat
6 See UNITED NATIONS, SECURITY COUNCIL; ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT ITS
4644TH MEETING, ON 8 NOVEMBER2002 [hereinafter RESOLUTION 1441], U.N. Doc. S/Res/1441
(2002).
' See President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation from the Oval Office (Mar. 19,
2003) (announcing the beginning of military combat in Iraq and justifying the action by
reference to Resolution 1441 and the earlier resolutions from the Persian Gulf War, and by
insisting that the United States had a right to preemptively protect its security interests), http:II
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/2003017-7.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2003).
President Bush also purported to justify the military action by involving the "Bush Doctrine."
See President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 29, 2002) (announcing policy
of preemption, commonly referred to as the "Bush Doctrine"), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2002/01/20020129-! 1.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2003).
a See U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
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to international peace and security that cannot be resolved by non-proliferation
measures, and that the combined action of the United Nations and the United
States is required to avert disaster.
I1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Post-Colonial Division of India
The former British colony of India consisted of nine provinces and 584
"princely states" which retained their internal sovereignty while being subject
to the British Crown in relation to external affairs.9 Each of these princely
states was ruled by either a Hindu leader, called a Maharajah, or a Muslim
leader, called a Nawab.' ° At the end of British colonial rule in 1947, the
princely states were each granted complete independence." The provinces
were partitioned into the states of Pakistan and India. 2 The newly independent
princely states had three options: (1) join Pakistan, the newly created Muslim
state in the north, or (2) join the sub-continental Indian state, or (3) become an
altogether independent state. 3 Generally, states with majority Muslim
populations joined Pakistan while states with majority Hindu populations
joined India. However, some states made their choice based on geography. 4
The princely state of Kashmir 5 was somewhat unusual in that the majority
of its population was Muslim, but it was ruled by a Hindu leader, Maharajah
Hari Singh.' 6 Kashmir initially attempted to become independent. When
Pakistan attempted to annex the state, citing as justification the majority
Muslim population, Singh solicited the military aid of India. 7 India demanded
9 See Khan, supra note 1, at 504.
I Id. at 504-05.
See id.
12 Id. at 505.
"3 See id.
14 See Michael L. Feeley, Apocalypse Now? Resolving India's and Pakistan's Testing
Crisis, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 777, 780 (2000).
15 The full original name of the princely state was "Jammu and Kashmir". Because of
modem usage and for the sake of brevity, this Note will refer to both the former state and the
currently disputed territory as simply "Kashmir."
16 See Anthony Wanis St. John, The Mediating Role in the Kashmir Dispute Between India
and Pakistan, 21 FLETCHER F. WoRLD AFF. 173, 175 (1997). But see Khan, supra note 1, at 507
(discussing the accession by the Nawab of Junagadh, a Muslim, to Pakistan against the wishes
of his predominantly Hindu citizenry).
"7 See Feeley, supra note 14, at 780.
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as a condition of its assistance that Kashmir join India.'" Singh agreed, and
India pushed the Pakistani troops back into the western third of Kashmir, with
both sides eventually settling on the militarized "Line of.Control."' 9 This line
has been the boundary of the dispute sine 1948.20
B. Subsequent Conflict
Since the initial conflict following partition in 1947, India and Pakistan
have fought three wars, two of which were explicitly over the Kashmir
region.2' Even when the countries have not been officially at war, skirmishes
along the Kashmir border have been almost constant.2 2 Since the two nations
developed nuclear weapons programs, the conflict has become a grave threat
to the stability not just to the region, but of the world. A nuclear conflict
between these two populous nations would have global security complications,
particularly for China, Russia, and the Middle East.23 Despite some recent
diplomatic olive branches extended by India and Pakistan, the underlying
tensions remain high and the situation has great potential for conflict.2'
ImI. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN KASHMIR
A. Nuclear Threat
Prior to 1998, the United States and other major powers with sophisticated
intelligence operations assumed that India and Pakistan were non-nuclear
states, despite some evidence indicating development of nuclear programs.25
IS See St. John, supra note 16, at 175.




23 See id. at 501.
24 See Gautum Singh, Separatist Leaders from Kashmir Visit New Delhi to Hold Talks with
Indian Officials, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWlRES, Aug. 2, 2003 (discussing talks held between
a major Kashmiri separatist group and Indian officials, and mentioning recent peace gestures by
both countries); see also World In Brief, WASH. POST, July 26, 2003, at A17 (describing the
current situation in Kashmir as a "relative lull" since peace gestures were made in April 2003,
while nonetheless reporting eleven suspected Muslim rebels and five Bangladeshis killed by
Indian security forces in four separate incidents, as well as exchanges of artillery fire between
Indian and Pakistani troops across the Line of Control).
' See Guthrie, supra note 2, at 498-501.
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In 1998, both nations abruptly announced their nuclear status to the world by
testing nuclear weapons.26 Each nation uses the nuclear status of its neighbors
(each other and China, which controls a small portion of Kashmir and
possesses nuclear weapons) to justify the maintenance and further develop-
ment of their nuclear programs.27
On December 13, 2001, an attack by a Pakistan-based terrorist group on the
Indian Parliament building in New Delhi killed nine Indians, and dramatically
heightened tensions between India and Pakistan.28 Both countries moved
troops closer to the Kashmiri Line of Control and clashes increased in both
intensity and frequency.29 Both countries also moved significant weapons
systems closer to the border; for example, India moved ballistic missiles
capable of carrying nuclear warheads." A few months later, in late May 2002,
Pakistan further exacerbated the situation by testing a nuclear-capable
missile.3 The nations' leaders eventually heeded U.S. diplomatic calls for de-
escalation and avoided what would have been their fourth all-out war since
partition in 1947.32 However, tensions remain high and another attack similar
to the one on the Parliament building could easily set off a major, perhaps
nuclear, conflict. 3 The governments of India and Pakistan have downplayed
the likelihood of nuclear conflict.34 Instead, they claim to appreciate the
consequences of a nuclear conflict and are quick to assure that any war
between the two countries would be a conventional one; Pakistani President
Musharraf was quoted as saying, "Any sane individual cannot even think of
26 Id. at 499.
2 See id. at 501.28 The five militant gunmen who perpetrated the attack were also killed. See Michael
Schaffer & Thomas Omestad, India and Pakistan Become the Powder Keg Next Door, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 14, 2002, at 18.
See id.
0 See Anthony Spaeth, Looking Down the Barrel: India and Pakistan Rev up Their
Militaries, Raising Fears of a New War Between Nuclear-armed Enemies, TIME MAG., Jan. 14,
2002, at 28.
" See Peter Popham, India Stands Firm in Its Refusal to Talk to Pakistan, INDEP. (London),
June 4, 2002, at P8.
32 See Spaeth, supra note 30, at 35 (describing how U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell and
President George W. Bush urged Pakistan to crack down on militant groups and emphasized to
India how Pakistan was doing so).
33 See Laura Bradford, Path To War, TIME MAG., June 10, 2002, at 34.
See, e.g., Popham, supra note 31, at P8 (quoting India's Defense Minister George
Fernandes, "[i]f the Western powers and China know how to keep their nuclear capabilities
under control, the same holds good for India and Pakistan").
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discussing a nuclear exchange," while Indian Defense Minister George
Fernandes has said "We have not been thinking nuclear."3
Still, in the case of conventional war, what happens if a conventional
ballistic missile is misidentified as one bearing a nuclear warhead?36 The
responding country would have very little time to make this important
determination, and suspicion that the missile is nuclear, correct or incorrect,
might provoke a nuclear response.37 The reliable command and control
systems as well as the lines of communication between potential nuclear
opponents that helped the United States and the USSR avoid nuclear conflict
during the Cold War do not exist in either India or Pakistan.3" Also, India and
Pakistan share a border; the nuclear missiles would have a much shorter
distance to travel, and therefore would allow for much less reaction time, than
those during the Cold War. India and Pakistan are also engaged in sporadic
small-scale conventional conflict, thus greatly enhancing the opportunities for
an accidental nuclear exchange.39
B. Connection to Terrorism
The danger of the current situation in Kashmir goes beyond the possibility
of a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan. Another major concern is
the relationship between the conflict and terrorism.' There are several
fundamentalist Islamic groups in Pakistan that are known to be involved in
terrorism.4 Much of the terrorism is aimed at India in support of either
Pakistani control of Kashmir or Kashmiri independence. 2 There is also
evidence of a connection between some of these groups and al-Qaeda, the
35 NPR: Morning Edition (National Public Radio, Inc. radio broadcast, June 3, 2002).
36 See Feeley, supra note 14, at 793.
" See id.
31 See id. at 794.
39 See id. at 793.
1 See Linda Robinson, A Timeworn Terrorism List, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 20,
2002, at 18 (suggesting that Pakistan could have been included in President Bush's "axis of evil"
list of states sponsoring terrorism because of its support for the Taliban and Kashmiri terrorist
groups).
41 See Yonah Alexander, Terrorism In the Twenty-First Century: Threats and Responses,
12 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 59, 70 (1999) (citing Harkat ul Mujahideen as an Islamic terrorist group
based in Pakistan and dedicated to liberating India's Kashmir and discussing the group's
relationship to training camps in Afghanistan).
42 See Schaffer & Omestad, supra note 28, at 18 (describing Pakistan's support for Kashmiri
separatist groups).
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terrorist group led by Osama Bin Laden, which was responsible for the
September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States.43 According to an expert
report on post-war Afghanistan,
Pakistan... will likely soon host more Taliban members and
sympathizers than Afghanistan. While Pakistan has played a
crucial role in supporting American efforts to defeat the Taliban
and destroy al-Qaeda, a number of powerful government institu-
tions are highly supportive of the objectives of the Taliban and
al-Qaeda... The Pakistani security service. . . is of particular
concern, as well as certain agencies and personnel involved in
Pakistan's nuclear weapons program."
A clear danger exists that terrorists sympathetic to or affiliated with al-Qaeda
may influence Pakistani policy or perhaps even obtain access to or control of
Pakistani nuclear weapons.
Pakistan is politically unstable, and the Kashmir conflict contributes to the
instability.45 If the instability rose to the point of Musharraf losing control of
the government to fundamentalists sympathetic to the cause of terrorist groups,
those groups could obtain access to the country's nuclear stockpile.46 These
conditions greatly enhance the likelihood of nuclear conflict with India, and
potentially even a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States or Europe."
"' See Alexander, supra note 41, at 71 (citing David Johnston, Evidence is Seen Linking Bin
Laden to Algerian Group, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2000, at Al).
" Michael P. Scharf & Paul R. Williams, Report of the Committee of Experts on Nation
Rebuilding in Afghanistan, 36 NEW ENG. L. REv. 709, 711 (2002).
" See Michael J. Kelly, U.N. Security Council Permanent Membership: A New Proposalfor
a Twenty-First Century Council, 31 SETON HALL L. Rnv. 319, 356 (2000) (questioning
Pakistan's stability in light of the coup d'dtat which replaced the democratically elected Prime
Minister with the Army Chief of Staff (current President Musharrat)); see also Miriam Donohoe,
Complete Country in Context, IRISH TiMEs, Oct. 5, 2002, at 60 (describing Pakistan's history of
political instability and the seriousness of the Kashmir issue in that context).
4 See Alexander, supra note 41, at 72 (citing intelligence reports that at least a dozen
groups, in addition to al-Qaeda, "have shown an interest in acquiring or actively attempting to
obtain biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons").
' See id. at 71-72 (describing the connection between al-Qaeda and Pakistani (and other)
terrorist groups, the desire to obtain nuclear weapons, and aJ-Qaeda's intention to attack the
United States and other Western-oriented governments).
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IV. THE INSUFFICIENCY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELEVANT
TREATIES TO DETER A NUCLEAR CONFLICT
A. Illegality of Nuclear Weapons under Customary Law
Under international law, the use, threat of use, and testing (at least above
ground) of nuclear weapons is illegal.48 The sources supporting such a
determination include an important International Court of Justice opinion and
several multilateral treaties. However, for various reasons, these sources of
law either do not apply to India and Pakistan and the Kashmir conflict or
would be inadequate to deter a nuclear conflict in the circumstances in which
one is likely to occur.49
In 1996, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered an advisory
opinion on the legality of the testing, use, or threat of use of nuclear weapons."0
The ICJ concluded that the general rule is that the use of nuclear weapons is
illegal due to inherent violations of humanitarian law principles.5' However,
the ICJ left open the possibility that the use of nuclear weapons in self-defense
may be legal in situations where the very existence of the state was
threatened.52
" See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (advisory opinion), 1996 I.C.J. 226
[hereinafter ICJ Advisory Opinion]; 48 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, opened for signature
September 24, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 439, art. 14, 1 [hereinafter CTBT]; Southeast Asia Nuclear
Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, Dec. 15, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 639; African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone
Treaty, June 21, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 704; South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, August 6, 1985,
24 I.L.M. 1442; Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, openedfor signature July
1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161; Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the
Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, T.I.A.S. No. 5433,480 U.N.T.S.
43 [hereinafter LTBT].
49 See Guthrie, supra note 2, at 505 (stating that the LTBT is the only treaty limiting
acquisition, manufacture and possession of nuclear weapons to which India and Pakistan are
parties); see also Schaffer & Omestad, supra note 28, at 18 (describing circumstances under
which a nuclear exchange could occur between India and Pakistan).
50 See ICJ Advisory Opinion, supra note 48.
"' See id. 92.
12 See id. 97
[I]n view of the current state of international law and of the elements of fact
at its disposal, the Court is led to observe that it cannot reach a definite
conclusion as to the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear weapons by a
State in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which its very survival
would be at stake.
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Under the conditions in which a nuclear conflict would likely occur in the
Kashmir conflict, both India and Pakistan could plausibly invoke the "very
existence" self-defense justification for their use of nuclear weapons.53 An
intentional and unprovoked offensive launch of nuclear missiles would be both
a blatant violation of international law and a suicidal act that both nations
would be unlikely to undertake.54 Instead, the most likely scenario for a
nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan would be a case of misidentifying
a conventional warhead as nuclear, or another similar miscalculation by one
nation that the other had attacked it with nuclear weapons." This belief would
arguably justify a nuclear retaliation56 as well as the ensuing retaliation for the
actual nuclear attack.
The point is not whether India or Pakistan would have a good legal defense
after a nuclear conflict has been initiated. If a nuclear exchange did actually
occur, the last thing either nation would be worried about would be justifying
themselves to the international community.57 India could already possess up
to seventy-four nuclear weapons at five kilograms of plutonium per warhead
and has a reliable intermediate-range ballistic missile.58 Pakistan could possess
between 16-20 nuclear weapons at 20 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium per
warhead and also has a reliable intermediate-range ballistic missile. Given
these nuclear capabilities and the disastrous results that could come from their
full utilization, neither India nor Pakistan would be expected to be concerned
with compliance with international law in the wake of a nuclear conflict. The
point is, rather, that regardless of any general illegality of nuclear weapons
under international law, their use under circumstances of self-defense by India
and Pakistan would likely not be illegal; more importantly, any such illegality
would not serve as a deterrent to their use under those circumstances.
" See id.
54 See NPR: Morning Edition, supra note 35.
5 See Feeley, supra note 14, at 793.
56 See ICJ Advisory Opinion, supra note 48.
5 The conventional fighting in the year or so following partition left over one million dead
and as many as ten million permanently displaced. Adam Packer, Nuclear Proliferation in South
Asia, 38 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 631, 634 (2000).
" Guthrie, supra note 2, at 499-501.
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B. Relevant Treaties
India and Pakistan are parties to only a few treaties concerning nuclear
weapons.59 They have not signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT), 6° but both are parties to the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT),6' which
limits testing of nuclear weapons to underground tests.62 Both nations are also
parties to multilateral environmental treaties that arguably limit the testing and
use of nuclear weapons.6 3
The CTBT, by which neither nation is bound, bans any party from carrying
out any test explosion or other nuclear explosion.' 4 The LTBT prohibits
nations from "causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the
carrying out [of] any nuclear weapon test explosion" in the atmosphere, in
outer space, or underwater.65 Protocol I of the Geneva Convention, 6 to which
Pakistan is a party but India is not, and the Convention on the Prohibition of
Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification
Techniques,67 to which both India and Pakistan are parties, both indirectly limit
the use of nuclear weapons by prohibiting the use of weapons that would cause
widespread and long-term damage to the environment. 68 Nuclear weapons
clearly fall into this category.
Commentators point to the seriousness of the current situation in Kashmir
to demonstrate the need for both India and Pakistan to sign the CTBT and
other treaties limiting the expansion of their nuclear programs.69 This Note
59 See id. at 505 (describing the nuclear weapons treaties to which India and Pakistan are
parties).
60 CTBT, supra note 48.
61 LTBT, supra note 48.
See id.
63 Protocol Additional (No. 1) to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts [hereinafter Protocol 1], June 8,
1977, 16 I.L.M. 1391; Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of
Environmental Modification Techniques [hereinafter ENMOD], Dec. 10, 1976, T.I.A.S. No.
9164, 16 1.L.M. 88.
6 See Vejay Lalla, The Effectiveness of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on Nuclear
Weapons Proliferation: A Review of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaties and the Impact of the
Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Tests on the Non-Proliferation Regime, 8 CARIOZO 1. INT'L &
COMP. L. 103, 108 (2000).
Guthrie, supra note 2, at 505.
6 See Protocol I, supra note 63.
67 See ENMOD, supra note 63.
6 See Guthrie, supra note 2, at 506-07.
69 See generally id. (arguing that treaties and custom have created an international custom
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contends, though, that rather than trying to influence India and Pakistan to sign
the CTBT treaty because they are engaged in a serious and protracted conflict,
the proper focus should be on the necessity of ending the conflict once and for
all because of the nuclear status of the two countries.7" This is because both
countries have tenable reasons for not signing the treaties and even signing the
treaties would not remove the danger so long as the conflict continues.7'
In the case of the CTBT, both countries point to each other's nuclear
programs, as well as that of neighboring China, as the reasons that they cannot
sign.72 It is, of course, precisely that sort of arms race that the international
community seeks to avoid. However, neither country trusts the other to sign
and then comply with a test ban, and so neither will sign.73
There is also an element of national pride involved for both India and
Pakistan in not signing the CTBT. Being a "nuclear nation" is a status symbol
that is diminished by any limit that is placed upon it. India and Pakistan not
only want to compete with each other, but also with the other nuclear nations
of the world. They feel that any limit on nuclear development is unfair
because of the advantage to long-time nuclear powers like the United States
and China, who already have stockpiles of nuclear weapons. 74 The United
against nuclear testing and that India and Pakistan need to be persuaded so as to avoid a nuclear
conflict); see also Feeley, supra note 14, at 781 (stating that it is "imperative" that India and
Pakistan sign the CTBT treaty).
70 See Khan, supra note 1, at 497-99 (describing the Kashmir dispute as "a serious threat to
the peace and security of the region" and discussing how the dispute might help cause a nuclear
conflict); see also St. John, supra note 16, at 176-77 (describing the current Kashmir situation
as "intolerable" and a "nuclear tinderbox" and underscoring the relationship between the
Kashmir conflict and a possible nuclear exchange).
' See St. John, supra note 16, at 176-77 (explaining Pakistan's reluctance to end nuclear
development because of India and India's claims of necessity for a nuclear program, including
the need for deterrence against China and the capability of response to an attack from Pakistan).
n Another Asian nation, North Korea, now admits to having a nuclear weapons program.
The United States suspects that Pakistan, among others, has aided North Korea in its nuclear
development. See Robert Fox, Danger That Crept Up Behind Us, EVENING STANDARD
(London), Dec. 27, 2002, at 5 (reporting that North Korea could be able to market nuclear
weapons to rogue nations or terrorists as early as the summer of 2003, earlier than Iraq); see also
Paul Haven, Pakistani PM Denies Nuclear Links, AP ONLINE, Jan. 6, 2003 (reporting that
"Western media have reported allegations of possible Pakistani nuclear leaks to both North
Korea and Iraq," possibly receiving in exchange from North Korea missile technology, and also
reporting that the Pakistani Prime Minister Zafarullah Khan Jamali had denied the allegations).
" See St. John, supra note 16, at 176-77.
74 See Feeley, supra note 14, at 787 (describing how India and Pakistan feel that treaty
limitations on nuclear development would lead to a world of nuclear "haves" and "have-nots").
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States has very little moral force in this area; as of the writing of this Note, it
has not ratified the CTBT treaty.75
V. UN RESOLUTIONS CONCERNING KASHMIR
The UN responded early and often when the post-partition fighting in
Kashmir erupted in 1947, both with a series of resolutions from the U.N.S.C.
and with active diplomatic mediation attempts to reach a viable solution.76 The
resolutions and diplomatic efforts produced few positive results and culmi-
nated in the cease-fire agreement of 197 1," which produced a UN-monitored
Line of Control but has not ended the conflict.7" Most of the resolutions were
reactions by the U.N.S.C. to military events in Kashmir.79 However, they all
contained the following themes: (1) If allowed to continue, the conflict was a
threat to international peace and security;' ° (2) A cease-fire agreement was
necessary;8" (3) Indian and Pakistani troops as well as other "unofficial" troops
75 See Lalla, supra note 64, at 104.
76 See generally S.C. RES. 47, U.N. SCOR, 3d Sess., 286th mtg. [hereinafter RESOLUTION
47], U.N. Doc. S/726 (1948); UNITED NATIONS, COMMISSION FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN;
RESOLUTION OF THE COMMISSION OF AUGUST 13, 1948, U.N. Doc. S/II00 Para. 75 (1948);
UNITED NATIONS, COMMISSION FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN; RESOLUTION OF THE COMMISSION OF
JANUARY 5,1949, U.N. Doc. S/i 196 Para. 15 (1949); S.C. RES. 80, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 470th
mtg. [hereinafter RESOLUTION 80], U.N. Doc. S/1469 (1950); S.C. RES. 91, U.N. SCOR, 6th
Sess., 539th mtg. [hereinafter RESOLUTION 91], U.N. Doc. S/2017/Rev.I (1951), available at
http://www.kashmiri-cc.ca/un/sc30mar51 .htm (last visited Nov. 14,2002); S.C. RES. 122, U.N.
SCOR, 12th Sess., 765th mtg. [hereinafter RESOLUTION 122], U.N. Doc. S/3779 (1957); S.C.
RES. 211, U.N. SCOR, 20th Sess., 1242d mtg. [hereinafter RESOLUTION 211], U.N. Doc.
S/Res/211 (1965).
" Agreement on Bilateral Relations, July 2, 1972, India-Pak., 858 U.N.T.S. 71 [hereinafter
Simla Agreement].
" See S.C. RES. 307, U.N. SCOR, 26th Sess., 1616th mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. S/Res/307
(1971).
" Resolution 47 was the most important of the initial resolutions following the breakout of
fighting in 1947 upon partition. It outlined a procedure for a plebiscite for Kashmir. See
RESOLUTION 47, supra note 76; Khan, supra note 1, at 513. Resolution 80 and Resolution 91
were responses to tentative cease-fire agreements that urged the parties to agree on a
demilitarization plan and reaffirmed the Security Council's commitment to the principles of
Resolution 47. See RESOLUTION 80, supra note 76; RESOLUTION 91 supra note 76. Resolutions
209, 210, and 211 were responses to the second all-out war in 1965. See S.C. RES. 209, U.N.
SCOR, 20th Sess., 1237th mtg. at 13, U.N. Doc S/Res/209 (1965); S.C. RES. 210, U.N. SCOR,
20th Sess., 1238th mtg. at 14, U.N. Doc. SIRes/210 (1965); RESOLUTION 211, supra note 76.
80 See, e.g., RESOLUTION 47, supra note 76.
81 See, e.g., RESOLUTIONOFTHECOMMISSIONOFAUGUST 13, 1948, supra note 76 (requesting
the governments of India and Pakistan to issue separately and simultaneously a cease-fire order).
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(non-military citizens from each side who were not natives of Kashmir but had
entered Kashmir to join the fight) needed to be removed from the region; 82 and
(4) After such removal a plebiscite should be held to determine the fate of
Kashmir. 3
The Resolution of the U.N.S.C. of April 21, 1948 stated that the "early
restoration of peace and order in [Kashmir]" was "essential" and that the
continuation of the dispute was "likely to endanger international peace and
security."84 Later resolutions echoed this concern. Yet, after more than fifty
years, the conflict has still not been resolved. The early resolutions were
drafted long before India and Pakistan became nuclear states. 85 If a conven-
tional territorial war in the region prompted U.N.S.C. action, then certainly the
possibility of a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan is actionable,
because the threat to international peace and security is greater.8 6
The resolutions called for, and nominally produced, several cease-fires.87
However, military and paramilitary exchanges across the Line of Control in
Kashmir occur on a constant basis even today. 8 No actual cease-fire has
existed for over fifty years.8 9
The resolutions called for Indian and Pakistani troops to be removed from
Kashmir.' Several articles also specifically referred to the removal of peoples
not "normally resident therein who have entered into [Kashmir] for the
purpose of fighting."'" The failure of the parties to complete a removal of
82 See, e.g., RESOLUTION OF THE COMMISSION OF JANUARY 5, 1949, supra note 76, 6b
(requiring all persons, other than citizens of Kashmir, who on or since August 15, 1947 entered
Kashmir for other than a lawful purpose, to leave).
83 See, e.g., RESOLUTION 91, supra note 76 (observing that the governments of India and
Pakistan had reaffirmed their desire that the future of the state of Kashmir be decided through
the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the
United Nations).
84 RESOLUTION 47, supra note 76.
"5 The earliest resolutions were passed by the U.N.S.C. when the post-partition conflict
began in 1947. India and Pakistan both became recognized as being nuclear states due to their
testing of nuclear weapons in 1998. See Guthrie, supra note 2, at 499.
86 See U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-51.
81 See, e.g., Simla Agreement, supra note 77.
88 See Guthrie, supra note 2, at 498.
89 See id.
90 See, e.g., RESOLUTION 80, supra note 76 (calling upon the governments of India and
Pakistan to implement their agreed upon plan of demilitarization of the State of Jammu and
Kashmir).
9' RESOLUTION47, supra note 76; see also RESOLUTIONOFTHECOMMISSIONOFAUGUST 13,
1948, supra note 76.
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troops was a major impediment to resolving the dispute.92 India justified the
fact that no plebiscite93 ever took place, despite its agreement to one, on the
basis that Pakistani troops never fully withdrew.94 Pakistan likewise justified
its military presence in the region on the basis of the continued presence of
Indian forces in Kashmir.
95
Arguably, the most important common component of the resolutions was
the call for a plebiscite.96 From the beginning of the conflict, India had
claimed that Kashmiri accession to India was a temporary solution and that
once a cease-fire was established, the fate of the region would be determined
in accord with the will of the people of Kashmir.97 Both the Indian and
Pakistani governments agreed to a plebiscite on multiple occasions as a means
of resolving the conflict.9 However, due to continued violence and occupation
of the region, with each nation blaming the other for their own refusal to
comply with Resolution 47, the plebiscite has never occurred.99
The plebiscite solution is more desirable for Pakistan than it is for India
because Kashmir is predominantly Muslim and would likely vote to join
Pakistan."° However, Pakistan opposed India's proposals for complying with
the plebiscite provisions of the resolutions because it perceived them as
unfair."0 ' Several of the resolutions themselves rejected India's proposal to
convene a "Constituent Assembly" because "the area from which such a
92 See Khan, supra note 1, at 514-15.
3 Several of the resolutions called for, and India and Pakistan agreed to, a plebiscite to
determine the fate of Kashmir. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 94-97.
9 See Khan, supra note 1, at 514-15.
9 See id.
96 See id. at 513 (noting the significance of Resolution 47 and its recognition "that the
question of accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be decided through the
democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite").
9" See id. at 508-09.
9' See id.; see also RESOLUTION 47, supra note 76; RESOLUTION OF THE COMMISSION OF
AUGUST 13, 1948, supra note 76; RESOLUTION OFTHE COMMISSION OFJANUARY 5, 1949, supra
note 76; RESOLUTION 80, supra note 76; RESOLUTION 91, supra note 76.
" See Khan, supra note 1, at 513-16.
10 See id. at 533-34. Khan supports an alternative to a plebiscite for the entire former state
of Jamnnu and Kashmir, which would likely result in the entire territory acceding to Pakistan,
which India will likely never agree to. The alternative is to transform the current line of control
into an international boundary and then to have a plebiscite for the Valley of Kashmir only.
While this would still likely result in the Valley acceding to Pakistan, it would mean less
territorial transfer and therefore it would be more likely that India would agree to the measure.
See id. at 517-18.
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Constituent Assembly would be elected is only a part of the whole territory of
[Kashmir]. ' 2
The various U.N.S.C. resolutions have accomplished very little toward
achieving a permanent resolution of the Kashmir dispute between India and
Pakistan." 3 The situation is still a threat to international peace and security.
There has been no permanent withdrawal of troops or cease-fire," 4 nor has
there been a plebiscite to determine Kashmir's fate.'05
The past U.N.S.C. resolutions are arguably still binding on India and
Pakistan, obligating them to abide by their agreements with the UN to
withdraw, cease-fire, and hold a fair and impartial plebiscite.0 6 However, a
new U.N.S.C. resolution focusing on the new threats to international peace and
security, specifically the heightened tensions and the development of nuclear
weapons by both nations, would have both more legal clarity and more
political force. 10 7 Also, a new resolution would be vital to securing the
involvement of the United States, since the existing resolutions provide no
specific authorization for either diplomatic or military intervention by any
Member States, including the United States. This new resolution could
reaffirm the basic ideas of the prior resolutions while providing more definite
consequences if either nation fails to comply.
102 RESOLUTION 91, supra note 76; see also RESOLUTION 122, supra note 76 (stating that any
action that the Constituent Assembly may have taken or might attempt to take to determine the
affiliation of Kashmir would not constitute a disposition of the State).
'03 See Khan, supra note 1, at 511.
,04 See Guthrie, supra note 2, at 498.
,o5 See Khan, supra note 1, at 514-23.
106 See id. at 534
[I]t is bad jurisprudence to construe a resolution as invalid simply because the
state to which it was directed could for decades successfully defy the will of
the Security Council. A Security Council resolution remains legally binding
until it is repealed, either directly or through a subsequent incompatible
resolution.
307 See id. at 534 (noting the length of time since the last resolution calling for a plebiscite
and the lack of enforcement of that resolution); see also id. at 540 (noting the failure to resolve
the dispute bilaterally, the escalating military conflicts, and the development of nuclear weapons
as factors giving rise to a legal obligation for India and Pakistan to resubmit the dispute to the
Security Council).
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VI. KASHMIR: A GREATER THREAT THAN IRAQ
In November of 2002, the U.N.S.C. passed a resolution reinstating
inspections of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capabilities.'0° The
resolution gave Iraq a deadline for full compliance and provided that any
failure would be reported back to the U.N.S.C., which would then subject Iraq
to "serious consequences."' ' Because this Note suggests there is a greater
legal justification for U.N.S.C. action in Kashmir than there was in Iraq, and
proposes the U.N.S.C. take action to resolve the dispute, it is useful to compare
the relative threat posed to international peace and security by Iraq prior to the
U.S.-led war there in 2003 and that of Kashmir.
A. Nuclear Weapons
One of the major justifications for action against Iraq was the possibility
that its leader, Saddam Hussein, was attempting to develop weapons of mass
destruction, including nuclear weapons."0 There is very little evidence,
however, that Iraq was close to achieving these goals, particularly with respect
to nuclear weapons."' On the other hand, India and Pakistan both openly
possess nuclear weapons and are engaged in daily military conflict." 2
Therefore, the threat of a nuclear incident arising from the Kashmir conflict is
far more definite and imminent than was that of Iraq.
log See RESOLUTION 1441, supra note 6.
"09 Id. The deadline for an Iraqi report was December 8, 2002, which they met by filing a
declaration the United States found unsatisfactory. Betsy Pisik, US. Rejects Iraqi Arms Report;
White House Says Weapons of Mass Destruction Were Left Out, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2002,
at Al. A deadline of January 27, 2003 was set for Hans Blix, the head of UN weapons
inspections in Iraq, to report on his findings; his report found no "smoking gun" proving the
presence of weapons of mass destruction but also found significant lack of cooperation on the
part of the Iraqi regime. See Bob Kember & Howard Witt, U.S. Not Ready to Back OffHussein;
U.N. Finds No Arms; White House Sees Other Evidence, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 9, 2003, at 1.
1o See Saccha Baggili, IAEA Chief Deems Weapons Inspections in Iraq "Inconclusive",
WMRC DAILY ANALYSIS, Jan. 7, 2003 (discussing the lack of a nuclear "smoking gun" in UN
weapons inspections and the impact on the legal justification for war with Iraq).
'" See id.
11 See Guthrie, supra note 2, at 498-501.
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B. Terrorism
Another possible justification for action in Iraq was its alleged support of
terrorism."' There is some proof that Iraq has supported Palestinian suicide
bombers in Israel by paying rewards to their families." 4 However, the link
between Iraq and al-Qaeda remains less than definite." 5 In comparison, there
is a solid connection between al-Qaeda and several of the Pakistani terrorist
groups operating in Kashmir." 6 As long as the Kashmir conflict continues,
there will be terrorist groups who want either independence or accession to
Pakistan of Kashmir. To the extent that these groups are allied with al-Qaeda,
the Kashmir conflict endangers international peace and security through its
relationship with terrorism at least as much, if not more, than the Saddam
Hussein regime did prior to the war.
C. Ongoing Conflict
The United States perceived Iraq as a threat to international peace and
security because of its development and use of chemical and biological
weapons and possible attempts to develop nuclear weapons." 7  Saddam
Hussein had also demonstrated a willingness to be an aggressor." 8 However,
there was no active military conflict occurring in Iraq when the United States
began the recent war. In Kashmir, a fifty-six year old conflict continues to
produce frequent casualties, both civilian and military." 9  The unstable
"' See Kember & Witt, supra note 109 (discussing U.S. intelligence reports that Iraq may
have shipped chemical weapons to Syria, a major sponsor of the radical group Hezbollah, and
fears that the weapons could be passed on to terrorists for use against Israel or other targets).
14 See Max Boot, Exploiting the Palestinians: Everybody's Doing It, WKLY. STANDARD, Ian.
13, 2003 (stating that Saddam Hussein has paid an estimated $20 million over the past two years
to families of Palestinian "martyrs").
15 See Toxin Find Brings Fears Home, NEW ZEALAND HERALD, Jan. 9, 2003 (discussing
longstanding British skepticism of U.S. assertions of a possible link between al-Qaeda and
Saddam Hussein, and the doubts raised by the recent discovery of al-Qaeda agents in the U.K.
with ricin, a deadly chemical weapon known to be used by an Islamic militant group based in
Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq).
116 See Alexander, supra note 41, at 71.
'1 See RESOLUTION 1441, supra note 6.
"' See John W. Head, What Has Not Changed Since September 11-The Benefits of
Multilaterism, 12-FALL KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 5-6 (2002) (discussing Iraq's use of chemical
weapons in its 1980's war with Iran and its aggression against Kuwait in 1990).
"9 See, e.g., India Proposes Expansion of Embassies to Pakistan, REUTERS ENG. NEWS
SERV., Sept. 23, 2003 (reporting a surge in violence despite attempts at peace by the
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dynamics of this conflict, particularly between two nuclear nations, presents
a greater threat to international peace and security than the unsubstantiated fear
that Iraq may be developing weapons of mass destruction.
20
D. Political Instability
Before the war, Iraq was perhaps a threat to international peace and
security, but it was not politically unstable. In fact, the intervention on the part
of the U.S.-led coalition that removed Saddam Hussein greatly increased the
instability in Iraq; the United States is still in control of Iraq as an occupying
power and the political future of Iraq is uncertain.'1
2
In contrast to the political stability of Iraq prior to the war, both India and
Pakistan have political problems that are exacerbated by their current conflict;
Pakistan is particularly unstable.12 2 The democratically elected Pakistani
government was overthrown in 1999 and replaced with a military regime led
by the new President (formerly General) Pervez Musharraf.123  There is
pressure from within and outside the country to have Musharraf relinquish his
position to a new democratically elected regime, but despite some small moves
governments of India and Pakistan, specifically refening to a villager killed by militants and a
soldier and seven militants killed in separate gun battles); Press Digest-Pakistani Newspapers,
REUTERS ENG. NEws SERV., Sept. 22, 2003 (reporting the killing of eighteen people in violence
in Kashmir, including four civilians in a liquor shop bombing); India Says Pakistani Shells Kill
Three in Kashmir, REUTERS ENG. NEWS SERv., Sept. 21, 2003 (reporting three civilians killed
and five wounded in an artillery attack across the Line of Control by Pakistani troops and also
reporting Indian troops firing on Pakistani forces, with no reported casualties); Indian Troops
Battle Kashmir Rebels, Five Dead, REUTERS ENG. NEWS SERv., Sept. 20, 2003 (reporting five
militants killed in a battle with Indian troops, as well as three militants and two soldiers killed
in a separate clash).
"2 See Bob Drogin, Banned Weapons Remain Unseen Foe: Frustrations Grow as One False
Lead AfterAnother Sends Teams of U.S. andAlliedArms Hunters Across Iraq, L.A. TIMES, June
15, 2003, at Al (discussing the continued failure to discover weapons of mass destruction in
post-war Iraq).
"' See, e.g., Yitzhak Nakash, The Shi'ites and the Future ofIraq, 82 FOREIGN AFF. 17 (2003)
(mentioning the continued occupation of Iraq by United States troops, and speculating on the
political future of Iraq).
112 See generally Elizabeth Mills, Pakistan-Vote of Confidence in Prime Minister
Strengthens Pakistan's Government, WMRC DAILY ANALYSIS, Dec. 31,2002, available at 2003
WL 2412646 (discussing the political challenges awaiting the newly elected Prime Minister
Zafarullah Khan Jamali).
123 See Angelique R. Kuchta, A Closer Look: The U.S. Senate's Failure to Ratify the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 19 DICK. J. INT'LL. 333, 335 (2001) (characterizing the coup
as producing an even greater threat of nuclear war between India and Pakistan).
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in that direction, he does not seem willing to do so anytime soon.'24 While a
democratic regime may seem preferable to a military one, it might actually
destabilize Pakistan. 25 At any rate, Musharraf is confronted with a difficult
situation as long as he remains in control. He must balance the need to
cooperate with the United States and the rest of the international community
concerning the "war on terror" with the pressure from Islamic fundamentalists
that want him to take a strong stand against the United States and India.'26
Both politically and economically, India is far more stable than Pakistan,
but still has significant sources of potential instability.'27 India is a secular
democracy, but much like Pakistan, it has to balance the interests of relations
with the West with appeasement of religious fundamentalists, in India's case
Hindus.'28 The Kashmir conflict is a drain on the scarce resources of both
.24 In October 2002, a prime minister, Zafarullah Khan Jamali, was democratically elected.
Under Pakistani law, he also had to survive a November vote in the lower house of Parliament,
and then a vote of confidence from the entire Parliament on December 30, 2002, both of which
he did. However, Jamali is not in complete control of the government. Musharraf remains
President and retains the power to override the legislature and to dismiss Jamali's government.
Jamali is in power for five years, but is subject to any number of confidence votes, which the
legislature can demand by a simple majority vote, and possible dismissal by Musharraf. See
Munir Ahmad, Pakistan's Prime Minister Survives Confidence Vote in Parliament, ASSOCIATED
PRESS NEWSWiRES, Dec. 30, 2002.
'25 See Pakistan: Opposition Leader Rules Out Plans to Destabilize Government, BBC
MONITORING, The News web site, Jan. 4, 2003, available at 2003 WL 4131973 (discussing the
possible destabilizing effects of a democratic opposition party and reporting that the party leader
claimed there were no plans to destabilize the new Jamali government, even though it is viewed
as a mere continuation of Musharraf's military regime).
126 See Howard Witt, Terror War Has U.S. in Dubious Alliances, CIE. TRIB., Sept. 4, 2002,
at PI (discussing U.S. praise for Musharraf for his assistance in the war on terrorism and the
simultaneous U.S. hope that Musharraf will keep his promise to prevent Pakistani militants from
attacking India in Kashmir).
127 See UNITED STATES CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD FACT BOOK, INDIA
INTRODUCTION 2001 (2001), available at http:/workmall.com/wfb200l/india/india-
introduction.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2003) (discussing Indian concerns with the dispute with
Pakistan over Kashmir, overpopulation, environmental degradation, poverty, and ethnic strife
despite impressive gains in economic investment and output). Cf. UNITED STATES CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD FACT BOOK, PAKISTAN ECONOMY 2001 (2001), available at
http://workmall.comwfb200l/pakistan/pakistan-economy.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2003)
(describing Pakistan as poor, heavily populated, suffering from internal disputes, lacking in
foreign investment, and engaged in a costly confrontation with India).
'28 See generally UNITED STATES CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD FACT BOOK,
INDIA GOVERNMENT 2001 (2001), available at http://workmall.comwfb200l/india/india-
government.html (last visited Sept. 5,2003) (describing India as a federal republic with universal
suffrage, and also enumerating the numerous political parties and pressure groups, including
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countries,"' as neither can afford an all-out war. 3 ' However, neither
government can politically afford to ignore the conflict either. 3 ' Internal
pressures cause both governments to issue hardline rhetoric about the conflict,
which the governments may or may not be able to support. 32
None of the above is meant to suggest that Iraq was not a threat to
international peace and security prior to the 2003 U.S.-led war. Rather, this
Note compares the relative threats of the two situations to highlight the fact
that while Iraq was indeed a threat, the current situation in Kashmir is a larger
one, in need of greater international attention. The U.N.S.C. issued Resolution
1441 in response to the Iraqi situation, and was asked to pass another
resolution explicitly authorizing the use of force.133 If the situation in Iraq was
serious enough for the U.N.S.C. to consider Chapter VII action, so is the
current situation in Kashmir.
religious, militant, and separatist groups); see also Ashok Sharma, Hindu Nationalists Hope to
Consolidate Gains in Four State Elections, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEwswRES, Jan. 11, 2003
(reporting that Hindu nationalist party Bharatiya Janata viewed its massive victory in Gujarat
state as a mandate for "Hindutva," or "Hindu-ness," which implies the tenets of Hindu should
govern India, a secular nation since independence from Great Britain in 1947).
129 See Guthrie, supra note 2, at 503 (stating that twenty-four percent of Pakistan's total
budget for 1996-1997 was spent on defense and arguing that spending on continued nuclear tests
might bankrupt Pakistan).
130 See Feeley, supra note 14, at 798-99 (discussing the feeble state of both India and
Pakistan's economies, particularly due to economic sanctions, and discussing the degenerative
effect that increased military spending and economic sanctions would have on both economies
and stability in the region, and instead endorsing economic incentives to halt nuclear escalation);
see also id. at 792 (stating that "neither country can afford nuclear testing and buildup costs, nor
a nuclear exchange").
' See id. at 783 (discussing the role of religion on both sides of the conflict).
3 See B. Muralidhar Reddy, No Chancefor Accidental N-War with India, THE HtNDU, Jan.
11, 2003 (reporting that Musharraf, after causing alarm by stating that India shouldn't expect
"conventional" war if it was to cross the Line of Control, was seeking to reassure the world that
there was no chance of an "accidental" nuclear war with India, and also quoting Musharraf as
saying that Pakistan was not ready to "grant any more concessions" to India on the Kashmir
issue); see also id. (reporting Indian Defense Minister Georges Femandes' warning in response
to Musharraf's comments that Pakistan would cease to exist in the event of a nuclear war).
"3 See U.S., U.K., Spain Introduce New Iraq Resolution, CNN.CoM, Feb. 24,2003, at http://
www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/02/24/sprj.irq.wrap/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2003).
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VII. THE NEW CUSTOM OF U.S. IMPLEMENTATION OF
U.N.S.C. RESOLUTIONS
U.N.S.C. resolutions made pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter are
theoretically binding on all member states. 34 However, to be effective, the
resolutions must be enforced. The Charter authorizes both the use of
"'measures not involving the use of armed force,"' 35 such as economic
sanctions or third-party diplomacy, as well as "action by air, sea, or land forces
as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security 136
as means of enforcing resolutions. The Charter also makes it incumbent on
member states to "make available to the Security Council, on its call and in
accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance,
and facilities. . . .", 3 U.N.S.C. resolutions are helpful in maintaining
international peace and security only to the extent that member states offer this
type of assistance in enforcing them. 3'
Some member states are in a better position than others to provide the
resources for enforcing U.N.S.C. resolutions. In the current post-Cold War
world order, the United States is in the best position of all.'39 Throughout the
1990's, beginning with the Persian Gulf War, the United States has offered
resources, both military and non-military, to enforce or implement U.N.S.C.
resolutions on multiple occasions.t" If it can be shown that a general practice
'34 See U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
135 U.N. CHARTER art. 41.
136 U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
137 U.N. CHARTER art. 43, para. 1.
131 See Maury D. Shenk, Note, The United Nations Security Council Consultation Act: A
Proposal for Multilateral Resolution of International Conflict, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 247, 250
(1991).
139 See OECD, ITALY-ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, GDP: TOP TEN COUNTRIES, at http://www.
italytrade.com/frenchlpages/info/econo.php#3 (charting the world's top ten GDP's in 1998, with
the United States leading at $8.491 billion, more than double second place Japan ($3.963
billion)) (last visited Sept. 8, 2003).
140 See Scott O'Hara, OPERATION DESERT STORM: MILITARY PRESENCE ALLIED FORCES, at
http://www.desert-storm.com/War/nations.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2003) (detailing the
contributions from all participants in the Persian Gulf War, the vast majority of which came from
the United States); S.C. RES. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg. [hereinafter RESOLUTION
678], U.N. Doc S/Res/678 (1990); UNITED NATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION,
SOMALIA UNOSOM I, at http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm (last updated
Mar. 21, 1997) (describing the U.S. role in the humanitarian intervention in Somalia); S.C. RES.
794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg. [hereinafter RESOLUTION 794], U.N. Doc. S/Res/794
(1992); Dr. Almon Leroy Way, Jr., How America Goes to War: The President, American Law,
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of using the United States as the enforcement mechanism for U.N.S.C. has
become accepted as law, then it can be said that the practice constitutes a rule
of customary international law.
A. State Practice
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, two major events occurred that caused
a shift in the way that the United Nations handled the resolution of conflicts.
The first was the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which effectively ended the
Cold War between it and the United States. 14' This left the United States as
the world's sole "superpower."' 42 Second, Iraq invaded and attempted to
annex its neighbor Kuwait. 43 In response, the U.N.S.C. passed a resolution
setting a deadline for Iraqi withdrawal.'" In the event of non-compliance, the
U.N.S.C. authorized the use of "any means necessary" to accomplish
& U.S. Military Intervention intoForeign Conflicts, TIIEPROGRESSIVECONSERVATIVE (June 10,
1999) at http://www.geocities.comlway-leroy/ProConVolTwolssueOnePage8.html (last visited
June 15, 2003) (discussing the U.S.-led intervention in Bosnia); S.C. RES. 816, U.N. SCOR, 48th
Sess., 3191st mtg. [hereinafter RESOLUTION 816], U.N. Doc. SlRes/816 (1993); Janet L.
Seymour, Operation Restore (Uphold) Democracy-Haiti, AIR UNIVERSITY LIBRARY, at http:II
www.au.af.mil/au/aul/bibs/haiti/haiti99.htm (last visited Jan. 12,2003) (compiling information
and resources related to the U.S.-led operation in Haiti in 1994); S.C. RES. 940, U.N. SCOR,
49th Sess., 3413th mtg. [hereinafter RESOLUTION 940], U.N. Doc. S/Res/940 (1994); S.C. RES.
1160, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3868th mtg. [hereinafter RESOLUTION 1160], U.N. Doc.
S/Res/1 160 (1998) (detailing the U.S role as part of the "Contact Group" who made diplomat
efforts to resolve the situation in Kosovo prior to the use of force); S.C. RES. 1203, U.N. SCOR,
53d Sess., 3937th mtg. [hereinafter RESOLUTION 12031, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1203 (1998) (noting
the agreement reached by the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the United
States Special Envoy and demanding full compliance with the NATO air verification mission);
S.C. RES. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 401 lth mtg. [hereinafter RESOLUTION 1244], U.N. Doc.
S/Res/1244 (1999) (authorizing an international security presence in Kosovo).
141 The actual dissolution of the U.S.S.R. occurred at the end of 1991, but the event that many
view as the end of the Cold War, the tearing down of the Berlin Wall separating East and West
Germany, occurred in 1989. See FRANK SMITHA, NOTES ON THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, ch. 51
(1998), available at http://www.fsmitha.com/h2/ch33.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2003).
14" See Dorcas EvaMcCoy, American Post-Cold Warlmages and Foreign Policy Preferences
toward "Dependent" States: A Case Study of Somalia, 163 WORLD AFF. 39 (2000) (stating that
the United States inherited the role of the world's sole superpower following the Cold War).
143 See OPERATION DESERT STORM, CHRONOLOGY: IMPORTANT EVENTS, at http://www.desert-
storm.comWar/chronology.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2003) (chronicling the invasion of Kuwait
by Iraq as occurring on August 2, 1990 and the annexation of Kuwait as occurring on August
8, 1990).
144 RESOLUTION 678, supra note 140.
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withdrawal. 4 5 When Iraq ignored the deadline, the United States led an allied
force in the Persian Gulf War, which resulted in expulsion of Iraqi forces from
Kuwait. 46
The operation in Kuwait was the first authorization of force to counter
hostilities by member states under Chapter VII of the UN Charter by the
U.N.S.C. since the Korean Conflict.'47 It was also the first time that one
member state, the United States, was given primary control over implementa-
tion of the resolution. 48
The next major use of Chapter VII authority by the U.N.S.C. was in
response to internal strife in Somalia in 1993.14' At the time, warlords were
dueling for control of the country at the expense of the population.' 50 In
response to calls from the U.N.S.C., member states sent humanitarian aid to
alleviate the suffering of the civilian population.' 5' However, the warring
factions would not allow the food to arrive at its intended destination.'52 The
U.N.S.C. authorized the member states to use force to ensure delivery of the
humanitarian aid.'53 These forces were ultimately led by the United States.
In 1991, the constituent republics of the Yugoslav Federation (Yugoslavia)
began one by one to secede and declare themselves independent states. 54 The
republic of Serbia and Montenegro attempted to stop this trend by using the
federal Yugoslav army and armies made up of Serb minorities in the republics
to militarily force the republics to remain in the federation.' 55 Croatia and
Slovenia won short battles for their independence. 56 In Bosnia, on the other
hand, thousands of Muslims and Croats were slaughtered in "ethnic cleansing"
perpetrated by the Bosnian Serbs with the assistance of Slobodan Milosevic,
the leader of Serbia and the president of the newly formed Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia.'57 In April 1993, NATO began enforcing the "no-fly zone"
145 Id.
"6 See OPERATION DESERT STORM, CHRONOLOGY: IMPORTANT EVENTS, supra note 143.
4 See Shenk, supra note 138, at 251.
8 See id. at 249.
'49 See RESOLUTION 794, supra note 140.




113 See id.; see also RESOLUTION 794, supra note 140.
"' See Way, supra note 140.
... See id.
156 See id.
'5 See id. Serbia and Montenegro formed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in April 1992.
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over Bosnia that the U.N.S.C. had established in October 1992."'8 For two and
a half years, the U.S.-led force maintained the no-fly zone and performed air
strikes in support of UN peacekeeping operations.159
The trend of a U.S.-led allied force carrying out U.N.S.C. resolutions
continued in 1994 in Haiti. In 1991, a military coup had ousted the democrati-
cally elected government in Haiti.' 6° Between 1991 and 1994, the UN and the
Organization of American States made various diplomatic efforts at reinstating
the overthrown government.' 6' In 1994, the U.N.S.C. authorized the use of
force to resolve the situation. 62 The United States organized a multinational
force and threatened action under the authorization of the resolution. 163 The
U.S.-led force implemented the resolution with very little resistance from the
military leadership of Haiti."6
The United States was called upon again in 1998 to enforce a U.N.S.C.
resolution dealing with the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Kosovo, a
region in southern Serbia, had long enjoyed a high degree of autonomy within
the former Yugoslavia but had lost much of that autonomy when the Yugoslav
leader, Slobodan Milosevic, brought Kosovo under the direct control of
Belgrade. 65 In 1998, Serbian police forces and Kosovar ethnic Albanians,
who make up a majority of the population in Kosovo but a minority in Serbia,
came into open conflict. "6 Intense diplomatic efforts were made to diffuse the
conflict, and these were supported and encouraged by the U.N.S.C. 167 When
diplomatic efforts ultimately failed, a U.S.-led NATO force operated an "air
verification" mission and, after the air strikes ended the conflict, operated a
The United States did not recognize this government as the successor state to the former
Yugoslavia. See Infoplease.com, Timeline: Yugoslavia, at http://www.infoplease.com/spet/
yugotimeline/html (last visited Nov. 13, 2003).
158 See id.; see also RESOLUTION 816, supra note 140.
159 See Way, supra note 140.
,so See Peace Operations Policy Program, UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN HAITI, at http:/www.
gmu.edu/departments/t-po/resource-bk/mission/unmih.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2003).
161 See id.
162 See RESOLUTION 940, supra note 140.
'6 See UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN HAITI, supra note 160.
164 See id.
'65 NATO's Role in Relation to the Conflict in Kosovo, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
ORGANIZATION, at http://www.nato.intkosovo/history.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2003).
166 See id.
167 See RESOLUTION 1160, supra note 140; RESOLUTION 1203, supra note 140.
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peacekeeping mission. 6 ' The availability of U.S. diplomatic and military
resources was instrumental in ending Milosevic's ethnic cleansing campaign.
The operations led by the United States in Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, and
Kosovo were the most significant uses of Chapter VII authority by the
U.N.S.C. in the 1990s. However, there was a significant amount of U.N.S.C.
Chapter VII action in the 1990's that did not fall within the U.S.-led enforce-
ment paradigm, most notably regional peacekeeping efforts in West Africa
(ECOWAS) and East Timor. However, state practice that is unanimous or that
cuts in only one direction is not necessarily required to establish a rule of
customary international law.'69 The prevailing trend of using the United States
to enforce major U.N.S.C. resolutions represents a substantial state practice
that, when coupled with the general acceptance of such practice as law, is
sufficient to establish a rule of customary international law.
Like the NATO operation in Kosovo, the 2003 U.S.-led war in Iraq did not
have explicit authorization from the U.N.S.C."7 ° Unlike Kosovo, there was
significant overt opposition to the use of force by the United States and its
allies in Iraq. 7 ' Many U.N.S.C. members, including permanent members
France, Russia, and China, wanted the inspections regime that had been
reinstated by Resolution 1441 to continue.172 France was the most vocal
opponent of the use of force; it explicitly stated that Resolution 1441 did not
168 See RESOLUTION 1203, supra note 140; RESOLUTION 1244, supra note 140. The NATO
operation in Kosovo was somewhat controversial because no U.N.S.C. resolution explicitly
authorized the use of force. See CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 218 (2003). The need, or lack thereof, for explicit
authorization of the use of force in U.N.S.C. resolutions, is unclear and was also an issue with
the 2003 U.S.-led war in Iraq. See CNN.cOM, supra note 133; see also Bush, Address to the
Nation from the Oval Office, supra note 7.
"6 See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). The court found that prevailing state
practice and consent created a rule of customary international law exempting unarmed
commercial fishing vessels from capture as prizes of war, despite the existence of contrary state
practice. Id.
170 See RESOLUTION 1441, supra note 6 (stating that "serious consequences" would flow from
Iraqi failure to comply with the resolution, but not authorizing the use of force explicitly).
171 See, e.g., Andrew Moravcsik, Striking a New Transatlantic Bargain, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
July 1, 2003, at 74 (discussing European opposition to the U.S.-led war in Iraq).
172 See, e.g., World Deeply Divided on U.S. Ultimatum on Iraq, Dow JONES INTERNATIONAL
NEWS, Mar. 18, 2003 (stating that Indonesia, India, France, Mexico, and China had expressed
regret over the United States' ultimatum on Iraq, and specifically quoting the premier of China
as saying that inspections "must continue").
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authorize the use of force and that it would veto any proposed resolution that
did give such an authorization. 173
The implications of the recent war in Iraq and the diplomatic lead-up to the
war are not yet entirely clear. On its face, the war can be viewed as simply
another example of the United States enforcing a U.N.S.C. Chapter VII
resolution (Resolution 1441) with force, and therefore yet another example of
state practice supporting the custom that this Note suggests. However, given
the debate in the U.N.S.C. leading up to the war, it is difficult to characterize
the war in that way; indeed, despite claims to the contrary, it is difficult to
believe that even the United States felt it was acting under U.N.S.C. authoriza-
tion. The United States seemed to claim that it could do whatever it wanted,
or more accurately, what it needed, to do to maintain its security, with or
without U.N.S.C. authority. To the extent that the United States was acting on
this legal basis, the recent Iraq war is state practice that is contrary to the
custom.
B. Opinio Juris
Assuming that a practice of U.S.-led enforcement of U.N.S.C. resolutions
has been established, it must further be shown that this practice has been
generally accepted as law. Acceptance is shown by evidence of states
behaving as if they are bound by the rule.'74 In the case of the U.S./U.N.S.C.
resolution enforcement rule, acceptance is demonstrated by U.N.S.C. votes,
participation in U.S.-led enforcement by other states, and acceptance of
U.N.S.C. resolutions authorizing the practice by the affected states. 171
The fact that the U.N.S.C. continues to vote to authorize the United States
to enforce its resolutions is evidence of acceptance, at least by those states
participating in the votes, of the practice as law. 176 The U.N.S.C. is made up
of five permanent members-the United States, the United Kingdom, France,
173 See Michael J. Glennon, Why the Security Council Failed, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, May-June
2003 (discussing France's threat to veto any resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq).
174 See North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.) (F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb.
20).
' See ICJ Advisory Opinion, supra note 48 (using UN General Assembly votes as evidence
in deciding whether a custom regarding the illegality of nuclear weapons had developed); see
also Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
United States) (Merits), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) (citing the practice of the parties as evidence
of acceptance by each of the existence of a customary rule).
176 See supra note 175.
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Russia, and China-and ten other members elected by member states to two-
year terms."' Thus, a significant number and variety of member states have
voted to authorize the practice of U.S.-led enforcement of major U.N.S.C.
resolutions.'78 Of particular significance is the fact that no permanent member
vetoed any of the votes, despite some political and ideological objections by
certain members. 79 This indicates that either those members feel politically
pressured to support the practice or they realize the importance of having an
enforcement mechanism to legitimize U.N.S.C. resolutions. In either case, it
demonstrates that the permanent members feel bound to allow the practice,
either by voting for a resolution or abstaining from a vote. 8 France's threat
to veto any resolution allowing the U.S. to use force in Iraq somewhat
undermines their previous pattern of acceptance. It is unclear at this point
whether the custom has met its demise, or whether France's objections were
instead limited to the factual context of the Iraq situation.
Further evidence of the acceptance of the practice of U.S. enforcement of
U.N.S.C. resolutions is found in the degree of participation by member states
in assisting the United States in its enforcement. States from every corner of
the globe participated in the Persian Gulf War of 1991. Troops and equipment
from many nations also participated in the operation in Kosovo and would
1 See U.N. CHARTER art. 23.
"s The non-permanent members at the time of RESOLUTION 678, supra note 140, concerning
Iraq were Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, Finland, Malaysia, Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, Romania,
Yemen, and Zaire. See SECURITY COUNCIL, ELECTED MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL:
1946-PRESENT, at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/membship/mem2.htm (last visited Sept.
7, 2003). At the time of RESOLUTION 794, supra note 140, concerning Somalia, they were
Austria, Belgium, Ecuador, India, Zimbabwe, Cape Verde, Hungary, Japan, Morocco, and
Venezuela. See id. At the time of RESOLUTION 940, supra note 140, concerning Haiti, they were
Brazil, Djibouti, New Zealand, Pakistan, Spain, Argentina, Czech Republic, Nigeria, Oman, and
Rwanda. See id. At the time of RESOLUTION 1160 and RESOLUTION 1203, supra note 140,
concerning Kosovo, they were Costa Rica, Japan, Kenya, Portugal, Sweden, Bahrain, Brazil,
Gabon, Gambia, and Slovenia. See id. At the time of RESOLUTION 1244, supra note 140,
concerning Kosovo, they were Bahrain, Brazil, Gabon, Gambia, Slovenia, Argentina, Canada,
Malaysia, Namibia, and the Netherlands. See id.
' See, e.g., John Quigley, State Responsibilityfor Ethnic Cleansing, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
341, 383 (1999) (describing China's abstention from the vote on action in Kosovo on the
grounds that it was primarily an internal Yugoslav matter). But see BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH,
supra note 168 (suggesting that the reason no resolution was passed authorizing force was a
threatened veto by either Russia or China).
180 See I. Maxine Marcus, Humanitarian Intervention Without Borders: Belligerent
Occupation or Colonization?, 25 HouS. J. INT'L L. 99, 105 (2002) (citing the increased
willingness since the end of the Cold War of the U.N.S.C. to cooperate on Chapter VII action,
specifically referring to humanitarian intervention).
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likely have participated in the recent war in Iraq if it had been explicitly
authorized by the U.N.S.C. The fact that states are willing to donate their
resources and put the lives of their soldiers in danger to support the U.S.
enforcement of U.N.S.C. resolutions is evidence of acceptance of the practice
as law. It is interesting to note that in the recent war in Iraq, which was not
explicitly authorized by the U.N.S.C., only a handful of member states assisted
the United States.
The use of force was necessary in the Persian Gulf War and in Kosovo
because the respective parties failed to comply with resolutions. '' In Haiti and
Somalia, there were challenges against the legitimate government, thus making
it difficult to claim that the affected state had agreed to the resolution.'8 2 In
general, states that have been the object of U.S. enforcement have not objected
to the legitimacy of U.S. enforcement, but rather have maintained merely that
they were not in violation of the resolution in the first place. 3
C. Arguments Against Using the United States to Enforce U.N.S.C. Resolu-
tions
There are reasons that a custom of U.S. enforcement of U.N.S.C. resolu-
tions is undesirable, both from the U.S. perspective and from that of the
international community. From the U.S. perspective, the responsibility that
would come with a custom of U.S.-led enforcement of all major U.N.S.C.
resolutions may produce too large of a burden on the United States. From the
international perspective, there is fear that such a regime will address threats
to international peace and security only when it directly serves U.S. interests
to do so, or that the United States will use its authority to bully the world.
There is also the concern that the U.N.S.C. structure, with the five permanent
members having a veto, could undermine the ability of the United States to act
in certain situations. Each of these objections will be examined in turn.
First, there is a contingent in the United States that feels that the United
States already takes on more than its share of support for the operations of the
' See RESOLUTION 678, supra note 140; RESOLUTION 1203, supra note 140.
182 See UNITED NATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, SOMALIA UNOSOM 1,
supra note 140; UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN HAITI, supra note 160.
'1 See, e.g., Bryan Schwartz & Susan Waywood, A Model Declaration on the Right of
Secession, 11 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 1, 44 (1998) (describing how Iraq justified its aggression
toward Kuwait by claiming that it was part of Basra under Ottoman rule, and had been
illegitimately separated from Iraq by the British during colonial rule).
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United Nations.8 4 A practice of U.S. enforcement of U.N.S.C. resolutions
would likely add to that burden. The response to this position is that the
United States is the most prosperous and powerful nation in the current
international community, and along with the rights that such power brings
comes responsibility.
Second, there is apprehension among many members of the international
community that the United States is a "world bully" and that any action it takes
purportedly in the name of international peace and security would only be
taken to secure U.S. interests." 5 The operations in Iraq and Haiti arguably
support this assertion, while it is less clear that those in Somalia and Kosovo
do. Many point to the failure of the U.N.S.C. to act in Rwanda, where
thousands died in genocidal civil strife, as a prime example of the ineffective-
ness of the U.N.S.C. There were, however, legal reasons that the U.N.S.C.
failed to act in Rwanda, and Kosovo has perhaps introduced a customary norm
of humanitarian intervention even in wholly internal matters. Also, the U.S.
enforcement custom was new and not yet fully developed at that time. At any
rate, the effectiveness of the custom is dependent upon the United States
viewing the achievement of international peace and security as being in its own
interest. The increasingly interdependent and global nature of the world's
economic and political structures provides the impetus for this to occur.'86
Lastly, the danger remains that other permanent members of the U.N.S.C.
might use their veto power to undermine the effectiveness of the custom.
However, those members did not do so during the 1990s while the custom was
being established. With the end of the Cold War, the permanent members
seem much less likely to use the veto simply to thwart a political foe; if a veto
were to be used under the current regime, it would likely be for a legitimate
concern counseling against Chapter VII action, and thus would simply be an
example of a U.N.S.C. mechanism working as it was designed to work, As
mentioned above, it is unclear which category France's recent veto threat falls
"' See Stephen M. De Luca, The Gulf Crisis and Collective Security Under the United
Nations Charter, 3 PACE Y.B. INT'L L. 267, 295 (1991) (asserting that the United States was
taking on the "tremendous burden" of enforcing U.N.S.C. resolutions against Iraq with little
assistance from allies or other member states).
' See, e.g., Beth Stephens, Accountability Without Hypocrisy: Consistent Standards, Honest
History, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 919,921-22 (2002) (describing the United States as a "big bully,
throwing our weight around the world").
196 See MARK R. AMSTUTZ, INTERNATIONALCONFIcr AND COOPERATION: ANINTRODUCTION
TO WORLD POI[TICs 4 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing the increasing interdependence of global
society).
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into, and therefore whether it represents a threat to the effectiveness of the
custom. The custom is far more likely to survive and to be effective if the
United States works within the U.N.S.C. rather than attempting to use it as a
rubber stamp for whatever it desires to do.
D. Summary
The practice of U.S.-led enforcement of U.N.S.C. resolutions, combined
with the acceptance of this practice as law, establishes it as a rule of customary
international law. The existence of this custom creates an opportunity for the
U.N.S.C. and the United States to work together to resolve the Kashmir
dispute. Because of the threat that the dispute poses to international peace and
security, the U.N.S.C. and the United States should act to eliminate it.
Most of the state practice discussed above involved the use of U.S. military
force to implement a U.N.S.C. Chapter VII resolution. However, force is not
needed in all cases, and ideally would not be necessary to resolve the Kashmir
situation. In the recent past, there have been several examples of Chapter VII
diplomatic solutions by the U.N.S.C., which were then backed by force only
if not corrected. This was the situation in Bosnia, where the United States,
through NATO, had negotiated a cease-fire under Chapter VII authority. Force
only became necessary when the negotiated cease-fire was not observed.
To resolve the conflict in Kashmir, the U.N.S.C. could pass a resolution
under Chapter VII demanding diplomatic negotiations between India and
Pakistan and authorizing a U.S. envoy to mediate the talks. If determined
efforts to reach a solution proved successful, the United States would have
primary responsibility, in conjunction with India and Pakistan themselves, for
overseeing the implementation of the agreement. If necessary, the United
States would also have to be willing to lead a peacekeeping force to ensure that
the agreed upon solution remained in place.
VIII. CONCLUSION
India and Pakistan have been involved in a dispute over the Kashmir region
for about fifty-six years. The conflict is a continuing threat to international
peace and security. Upon the end of British colonial rule, each princely state
decided to accede to either India or Pakistan, or to become an independent
state. Kashmir initially opted for independence but then acceded to India in
exchange for Indian military assistance against invading Pakistan, thus
beginning a conflict over Kashmir that has lasted until the present day. In
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recent years, the tensions have heightened with increased engagements across
the Line of Control and with the development and testing nuclear weapons by
each nation.
The nuclear aspect of the conflict makes it a matter of concern not only for
the region but also for the entire world. The relationship of the conflict to
terrorism also underscores its nature as a conflict of international concern. It
is in the best interest of the entire world for the conflict to be resolved both
quickly and finally.
The use of nuclear weapons is generally illegal under international law
except in cases of self-defense in which the very existence of a state is
threatened. It is under precisely these circumstances that a nuclear exchange
would be most likely between India and Pakistan. Since international law is
an insufficient deterrent to nuclear conflict, and because there are political
conditions which make it highly unlikely that both nations will sign the CTBT,
the Kashmir conflict needs to be resolved to avert a possible nuclear show-
down over Kashmir.
The United Nations Security Council was asked to authorize the use of
force against Iraq to enforce U.N.S.C. resolutions regarding its development
of weapons of mass destruction. Kashmir is a greater threat to international
peace and security than Iraq was prior to the 2003 U.S.-led war because both
India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons, there is a more definite link between
the Kashmir conflict and terrorism, there is an ongoing military conflict in the
region, and the conflict contributes to current domestic political instability in
the two countries. The U.N.S.C. was involved in the Iraq situation, and since
the Kashmir situation poses a greater threat, the U.N.S.C. should move it to the
forefront of its agenda, as should the United States.
For action taken by the U.N.S.C. to be effective, it must be supported by
resources and enforcement from member states. Since the end of the Cold War
in 1990, a new custom has developed within the U.N.S.C. of authorizing a
U.S.-led coalition to enforce major resolutions. The state practice that has
established this custom include the Persian Gulf War, the humanitarian
mission in Somalia, the enforcement of the no-fly zone in Bosnia, the action
to replace the democratic government in Haiti, and the peacekeeping operation
in Kosovo. Evidence of acceptance of this practice as a customary rule is
found in U.N.S.C. votes, in participation in U.S.-led actions, and in acceptance
of U.N.S.C. resolutions by affected states. The unique position of the United
States as the world's sole superpower and the custom that has subsequently
developed present a singular opportunity for the United Nations and the United
States to work together to resolve the Kashmir dispute.
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